Do penalty ratios predict disaster recurrence? Evidence from 25 environmental failures

Backed by Carole Zoom, BillyP, and David Lang
$310
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  • $310
    pledged
  • 26%
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  • 19
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About This Project

At 3:30 pm, August 8, 2023, Lahaina's water monitoring system went dark. By morning, 102 people were dead. Investigators found 84 governance failures. A $1,000 vegetation fine never enforced. In Brumadinho, companies paid 3.4% of fines; the river was destroyed again.

This study hypothesizes that fine structure predicts disaster recurrence better than enforcement record alone and will test this hypothesis across 25 formally investigated cases, producing an open-access penalty-ratio dataset.

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What is the context of this research?

Environmental governance has documented enforcement gaps for decades. What we lack is a dataset linking fine structure, not just enforcement, to recurrence. A fine set too low to change behaviour produces the same outcome whether enforced or not. The failures look identical but require different remedies.

In Lahaina, Hawaiʻi (2023), the vegetation management fine was $1,000: never enforced. Investigators identified 84 governance failures [FSRI 2024]. In Brumadinho (2019), a dam certified stable months before collapse killed 272 people and destroyed the Paraopeba River. The same company's dam had failed at Mariana four years prior; Vale paid 3.4% of fines [IUCN NL 2023]. Brumadinho happened anyway.

Both share a structural condition: fine regimes acted as permission, not a deterrent. Responsive regulation theory predicts that penalties below the cost of harm license rather than deter [Ayres and Braithwaite 1992]. This study tests that prediction across 25 formally investigated cases.

What is the significance of this project?

This study produces the first comparative dataset linking fine structure, cost-of-harm, and disaster recurrence across 25 formally investigated disasters.

For governance reformers: the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction is currently due for review. Its indicators measure disaster impact on human systems. None measures whether regulatory instruments meant to prevent disasters were structurally capable of doing so. This dataset provides the empirical foundation for that argument.
For researchers: the penalty-as-license problem has been theorised in regulatory scholarship but not tested comparatively in disaster governance at this scale. The coded dataset, coding protocol, and working paper will be published open access for replication and extension.


The practical implication is direct: if fine structures — not just enforcement — predict recurrence, enforcement reform alone cannot prevent the next Brumadinho.

What are the goals of the project?

This study will:

(1) code 25 formally investigated disasters (2000–2024) for six variables: maximum statutory fine, fine actually imposed, cost-of-compliance, cost-of-harm, enforcement record, and recurrence within ten years.
(2) calculate the penalty ratio — fine-to-harm — for each case, making the "price of harm" legible across jurisdictions.
(3) develop a taxonomy distinguishing fine structures that are too low by design, appropriate but unenforced, and enforced but absorbed as operating cost.
(4) test whether penalty ratio and enforcement record predict recurrence.
(5) publish the dataset, coding protocol, and working paper open access.
Cases selected for geographic diversity (8+ countries, four+ continents) and presence of a formal investigation report.
Anchor cases: Lahaina/Hawaiʻi (2023), Brumadinho/Brazil (2019), Mariana/Brazil (2015), Lac-Mégantic/Canada (2013), Deepwater Horizon (2010).

Budget

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Document access funds fee-based retrieval of Brazilian court proceedings, PACER access for US federal records, and FOI filing fees across up to five jurisdictions. Translation covers 2,000–3,000 words of Portuguese and Spanish regulatory and legal text. Coding software enables systematic cross-case comparison. Independent verification funds one to two protocol review sessions with a graduate researcher or practitioner. Researcher stipend Partial compensation for protocol development, case selection, cross-case analysis, and working paper drafting — estimated 10 hours at $20/hr. Research conducted without institutional salary support.

Endorsed by

Having worked with Bael on the aftermath of the Maui Wildfire Disaster, I am eager for more information on how the throw away penalties could've been more effectively managed and how in other situations meaningful penalties can be a deterrent. More research in this area is greatly needed.

Project Timeline

Research begins immediately after funding closes. In month one, case selection and coding protocol are finalised and five anchor cases extracted. Month two completes all 25 cases and research assistant verification coding. Month three reconciles disagreements, develops the taxonomy, and produces an open-access visualisation. Month four delivers the working paper, dataset, and coding protocol published under Creative Commons.

Jul 01, 2026

Project Launched

Aug 17, 2026

Milestone 1: Complete coding protocol and extract five anchor cases (Lahaina, Brumadinho, Mariana, Lac-Mégantic, Deepwater Horizon). Protocol published for comment.

Sep 18, 2026

Milestone 2: Complete all 25 cases. Research assistant verification coding reconciled. Penalty ratio calculated for each case.

Oct 19, 2026

Milestone 3: Penalty-as-license taxonomy developed. Open-access visualisation of penalty ratios across all 25 cases published.

Nov 20, 2026

Milestone 4: Working paper, complete dataset, and coding protocol published under Creative Commons open access.

Meet the Team

Bael Jordan
Bael Jordan
Data and Compliance Manager, Maui Disaster Recovery Program (former)

Bael Jordan

I am an independent researcher living in Haiku, on the island of Maui, Hawaiʻi. My doctoral research investigates why disaster governance systems consistently fail to recognise the non-human actors (watersheds, fire, land, ecosystems) that determine whether disasters are prevented or merely survived. On August 8, 2023, wildfire destroyed the town of Lahaina, twelve miles from where I now live. Within weeks, I was working in the disaster's aftermath. Within months I was serving as Data and Compliance Manager for the federally funded multi-agency recovery program: leading governance, audit-readiness, and compliance functions across a network of up to eight partner organisations under simultaneous FEMA, DHS, state, county, and funder oversight. I held that role for eighteen months. I watched the penalty-as-license problem operate in real time. A $1,000 vegetation management fine, set years before the fire, but never enforced in the Lahaina area.

Fine structures are governance choices; when those choices are shaped by the same actors whose behaviour the fine is supposed to govern, the deterrent becomes a price list.
My background is organisational governance, compliance framework design, and multi-agency data systems. My MBA in Healthcare Administration (WGU, 2025) developed formal capacity in regulatory governance; eighteen months in the Maui Disaster Recovery Program applied it directly across multi-jurisdictional legal structures. Prior to that, six years managing governance for a 47-acre conservation research organisation gave me early exposure to the tensions between treating land as a managed resource and treating it as something with its own claims on governance decisions. I am currently applying to doctoral programmes at Leiden University, the University of Southern Denmark, and Lancaster University. This study is foundational data for comparative dissertation research across three disaster jurisdictions. All data will be published open access.

Additional Information

This study is the first in a series of precursor investigations designed to build the empirical foundation for doctoral research currently under application at institutions including Leiden University, the University of Southern Denmark, and Lancaster University.

The doctoral research investigates a structural condition that the penalty-as-license problem is one expression of: governance systems built entirely around human stakeholder categories that are responsible for managing environments whose non-human actors (watersheds, fire, land, ecosystems) are operationally central to every decision, yet have no legible governance standing. The comparative dissertation examines that condition across three jurisdictions with meaningfully different legal frameworks for nature's standing: Lahaina/Hawaiʻi, where no Rights of Nature framework exists and corporate extraction rights have historically dominated governance; Brumadinho/Brazil, where constitutional environmental protections are among the strongest in the world yet sequential disasters involving the same company and river system demonstrate that formal protections do not automatically produce organisational change; and Aotearoa New Zealand, where the Whanganui River holds legal personhood and Cyclone Gabrielle (2023) provides an empirical test of whether that recognition changed governance outcomes when disaster struck.

The penalty-as-license dataset this study produces is foundational to that comparative work. Before asking whether different legal frameworks for nature produce different governance outcomes, the research needs a baseline: what do regulatory fine regimes actually look like across disaster contexts, and do their structures predict the recurrence this research is trying to explain? That question has to be answered empirically, not assumed. This study answers it.

The timing is not incidental. The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, the primary international policy framework governing disaster response globally, is currently due for review. Its existing indicators measure disaster impact on human systems exclusively. None measures whether the regulatory instruments responsible for preventing disasters were structurally capable of doing so. The penalty-ratio dataset this study produces is directly applicable to that reform conversation. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights issued an advisory opinion in January 2025 declaring nature entitled to rights. The Rights of Nature movement is producing legal frameworks faster than the organisational and implementation research needed to make them effective.

This study contributes to closing that gap; and does so from a position of direct professional immersion in one of the governance failures it investigates. All data, coding protocols, and findings will be published open access, available to the policy, legal, and research communities working at this intersection before the doctoral research is complete.


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